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Unbalancing Pairing-Free Identity-Based
Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols For Disaster
Scenarios
Jie Zhang, Xin Huang, Wei Wang and Yong Yue
Abstract—In disaster scenarios, such as an area after a terror-
ist attack, security is a significant problem since communications
involve information for the rescue officers, such as polices,
militaries, emergency medical technicians and the survivors. Such
information is critically important for the rescue organizations;
and protecting the privacy of the survivors is required. Normally,
authenticated key exchange (AKE) is an underlying approach for
security. However, available AKE protocols are either inconve-
nient or infeasible in disaster areas due to the very nature of
disasters.
To address the security problem in disaster scenarios, we
propose two pairing-free identity-based AKE protocols that have
unbalanced computational requirements on the two parties.
Compared with existing AKE protocols, the proposed protocols
have a number of advantages in disaster scenarios: 1) They
are more convenient than symmetric cryptography-based AKE
protocols since they do not require any pre-shared secret be-
tween the parties; 2) They are more feasible than asymmetric
cryptography-based AKE protocols since they do not require any
online server; 3) They are more friendly to battery-powered and
computationally limited devices than pairing-based and pairing-
free identity-based AKE protocols since they do not involve any
bilinear pairing (a time-consuming operation), and have lower
computational requirement on the limited party. Security of the
proposed protocols are analyzed in detail; and prototypes of them
are implemented to evaluate the performance. We also illustrate
the application of the protocols through a vivid use case in a
terrorist attack scenario.
Index Terms—authenticated key exchange, ID-based cryp-
tography, pairing-free, unbalanced computational requirements,
disaster scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE past decades have witnessed a number of masscasualty disasters including both natural and human-
made hazards, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake in
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2011, the Indian Tsunami in 2004 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks
in 2011. Fortunately, advanced information technology has
saved numerous survivors by enabling collaborative work of
different teams and organizations through handheld or wear-
able devices such as tablets, smart phones, medical devices
and life detection instruments. By now, a number of schemes,
systems and standards employing information technology in
disaster scenarios are proposed, such as the IEEE 1512 Family
of Standards [1][2][3][4].
A. Problem
When applying information technology in disaster areas, a
significant problem is security. Data transmitted among rescue
officers’ devices carry information for their organizations;
and such information is critically important by its nature
[5]. If the information of the rescue organizations is leaked
to illegal parties or criminals who sneak into the affected
areas, disorganization will occur within these organizations
[5]. Besides, the law requires that privacy of patients and
victims should be protected [6]; and this also accords with
ethics.
The very nature of diasters poses critical challenges to
security. Since the network infrastructure is destroyed by the
attack, the Internet is unavailable; and devices are connected
by infrastructure-less manners [7][8][9]. In addition, devices
brought into the affected area have to work for hours powered
only by batteries due to the destruction of power infrastructure.
These limitations make a number of available security schemes
inconvenient or infeasible in disaster areas.
B. Motivation
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is the foundation of
security. It establishes authenticated session keys between two
(or more) entities. For disaster scenarios, the most suitable
AKE protocols are identity-based AKE (ID-AKE) protocols
[10][11][12][13], in particular, pairing-free ID-AKE protocols
[14][15][16] which are more lightweight than those involve
bilinear pairings. They accord with the situation of disaster
scenarios in the following aspects. First, they do not require
any pre-shared secret. In disaster areas, it is inconvenient
for devices to pre-share secrets since they may belong to
different organizations. Second, they do not require online
trusted servers. In disaster areas, it is often infeasible to
access online servers since the network infrastructure may be
destroyed.
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However, existing pairing-free ID-AKE protocols require
both parties execute equivalent computational tasks. In dis-
aster scenarios, communications often take place between a
computationally-limited device and a powerful one. Moreover,
devices in disaster areas often need to continuously work
for hours powered merely by their batteries. Therefore, to
better address the security problem in disaster scenarios, it
is significant to reduce the computational requirement on the
limited device in pairing-free ID-AKE protocols.
C. Contributions
We propose two pairing-free ID-AKE protocols that have
unbalanced computational requirements on the two parties. In
particular, we transfer scalar multiplications from one party
to another in pairing-free ID-AKE protocols. The protocols
are named Protocol I and II. Protocol I transfers one scalar
multiplication from the limited initiating device to the more
powerful responding device. Protocol II transfers one scalar
multiplication in the opposite direction; it is used for scenarios
where the initiating device is more powerful than the respond-
ing device.
The main contributions of our work include:
• A new idea is proposed to unbalance the computational
tasks of pairing-free ID-AKE protocols. The idea can be
applied to other existing paring-free ID-AKE protocols
[15].
• Design of the unbalanced and pairing-free ID-AKE proto-
cols. The unbalanced and pairing-free ID-AKE protocols
establish authenticated session keys for two parties that
one of them is a limited device. It dramatically reduces
the computational burden on the limited device. There-
fore, compared with existing AKE protocols, it has a
significant advantage in addressing the security problem
in disaster scenarios.
D. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we review the related work. In Section III, we introduce
the underlying cryptographic knowledge. In Section IV, we
present the unbalanced and pairing-free ID-AKE protocols.
In Section V, we provide security analysis of the proposed
protocols. In Section VI, we implement prototypes of the
proposed protocols and study the performance. In Section
VII, we illustrate the application of the proposed protocols
in disaster scenarios through a use case. Finally in Section
VIII, we conclude this paper and present our future work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews typical AKE protocols in related work.
A. Symmetric-AKE Protocols
Symmetric cryptography-based AKE (denoted by
“Symmetric-AKE”) protocols [17][18][19] require the
parties to share master keys in advance; or each entity
shares a master key with the same online trusted server.
Such protocols are inconvenient in disaster areas for the
following reasons. First, rescue officers arrive at the disaster
area at different times, and so do their devices. Therefore,
it is inconvenient for a device that has already entered the
affected area to pre-share master keys with all newly arrived
devices. Second, the online trusted server is unaccessible
since network infrastructure is destroyed by the very nature
of the disaster.
B. Asymmetric-AKE Protocols
Unlike Symmetric-AKE, asymmetric cryptography-based
AKE (denoted by “Asymmetric-AKE”) protocols [20], [21] do
not require pre-shared secrets. They allow parties to establish
authenticated session keys from their public information (i.e.,
public keys) and ephemeral secrets. However, to guarantee
the authenticity of the public keys, traditional asymmetric
cryptography requires a public key infrastructure (PKI) [22] to
maintain the certificates of the parties’ public keys. The core
component of PKI is an online certification authority (CA) that
issues certificates of public keys. However, the unavailability
of network infrastructure makes it impossible to implement
the PKI in disaster areas.
C. ID-AKE Protocols
Identity-based (ID-based) cryptography [23] is a promising
branch of asymmetric cryptography. It does not require any
pre-shared secret or PKI. Since Boneh and Franklin [24]
introduced the first ID-based encryption scheme from bilinear
pairings, a number of ID-AKE protocols from bilinear pairings
are proposed. Smart proposes the first ID-AKE protocol from
Weil pairings in [10]. However, this protocol does not provide
full forward secrecy [11]. To overcome the weakness of
Smart’s protocol, Shim proposes a new ID-AKE protocol from
Weil pairings in [11]. In [12], Chen and Kudla review ID-
AKE protocols and propose a new ID-AKE protocol which
has provable security in the modified Bellare-Rogaway (mBR)
model [25]. Scott presents unbalanced and paring-based ID-
AKE protocols in [13].
However, all of the above protocols involve bilinear pairings
which is a time-consuming operation. In order to alleviate
the computational burden, pairing-free ID-AKE protocols are
proposed. Cao et al. present a paring-free ID-AKE protocol
with only two messages in [14]. Ni et al. present a pairing-
free ID-AKE protocol [15] which has provable security in
the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model [26]. Recently,
L. Dang et al. propose an efficient and pairing-free ID-AKE
protocol with provable security [16].
Although the pairing-free protocols are more efficient than
those involve bilinear pairings, they require equivalent com-
putational requirements on the two parties. Therefore, they are
not perfectly suitable for communications between a limited
device and a powerful one in disaster areas.
D. Summary
We compare the aforementioned AKE protocols in Table
I. According to the table, we have two findings: (1) Pairing-
free ID-AKE protocols are the most suitable AKE schemes
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TABLE II
SYMBOLS.
Symbol Meaning
E The elliptic curve.
G The elliptic curve group.
Fp The finite field with the prime order p.
O The point at infinity.
P The generator of G.
Px, Py The x and y coordinates of the point P .
× The scalar multiplication.
‖ The concatenation of bit strings.
ID Identity.
E The attacker.
AdvantageE(k) The advantage of E under security parameter k.
Z+ The set of positive integers.
H1, H2 Cryptographic secure hash functions.
C Cost.
for disaster scenarios since they do not require any pre-
shared secret or PKI; and they are much lightweight than
pairing-based ID-AKE protocols. (2) All these available AKE
protocols require equal computations on the two parties even
if they have different computational capabilities.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the underlying cryptographic knowl-
edge. In addition, we list symbols used in the paper in Table
II.
A. Elliptic Curve Group
1) Definition:
Definition 1 (Elliptic Curve Group): An elliptic curve E
over a prime finite field Fp with order p is defined by the
following equation:
y2 = x3+αx+β mod p, where α, β ∈ Fp, 4α3+27β2 6= 0
The corresponding elliptic curve group G consists of all
solutions (x, y) of the above equation and O which is the
point at infinity. That is,
G = {(x, y)|x, y ∈ Fp, (x, y) ∈ E} ∪ {O}.
2) Operations: Let P and Q be points over G and n be an
integer. Two types of operations over G are defined as follows.
• Point addition +. The point addition of P and Q is
denoted by P +Q. The result is also a point over G.
• Scalar multiplication ×. The scalar multiplication be-
tween n and P is denoted by n× P . It means
n× P = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
The result is also a point over G.
Obviously, computing a scalar multiplication with a large n
is much more time-consuming than computing a point addition
between two points.
3) Difficult Problems: Let P be the generator of G, and X ,
Y and W be points on G such that X = xP , Y = yP and
W = wP for some unknown x,y,w ∈ [0, n − 1]. Problems
over elliptic curve groups are defined as follows.
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem. Given
(P,X, Y ), the CDH problem over G is to find the point
W = xyP .
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem. Given
(P,X, Y,W ), the DDH problem over G is to determine
whether or not W = xyP .
• Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) Problem. Given (P,X, Y )
and an oracle that solves the DDH problem over G, the
GDH problem over G is to compute W = xyP .
The hardness of CDH and GDH problems over G are assumed
in this paper. It underlies the security of the proposed proto-
cols.
B. ID-based System
1) ID-based Cryptography: ID-based cryptography embeds
the user’s identity in the public key to remove the use of public
key certificates. The identity can be the name, identification
number or email address of the user. In addition to users,
an ID-based system involves a trusted authority called Key
Generate Center (KGC). KGC establishes system parameters
and extracts ID-based private keys for users. ID-based private
keys are sent to users through secure channels.
2) ID-AKE: An ID-AKE protocol is composed of the
following three procedures:
• Initialization. This procedure is executed by KGC and
users. It normally involves the following phases:
– Firstly, KGC inputs a security parameter and outputs
the master key and system parameters. The master
key is secretly kept by KGC. The system parameters
are published to all the users. This phase is denoted
as “KGC Setup”.
– Secondly, given the identity of a user, KGC extracts
the ID-based private key for the user. The private key
is securely sent to the user. This phase is denoted as
“Key Extract”.
– Thirdly, the user stores the system parameters and
secretly keeps the private key.
• Key Agreement. This procedure is executed by users
(which are often called communicating parties). These
parties generate short-term keys, exchange values over
public channels and compute the shared secret respec-
tively.
• Session Key Derivation. This procedure is executed by the
parties. The parties derive session keys from the shared
secret key.
The initialization procedure is not executed in every run of
the protocol. The key agreement procedure is the core of an
ID-AKE protocol.
C. Security Proof in mBR Model
Security of the proposed protocols are proved under random
oracle model, in particular, the modified Bellare-Rogaway
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF AKE PROTOCOLS IN RELATED WORK.
Name of Scheme Advantages Disadvantages
Symmetric-AKE Protocols Lightweight (1) Requiring pre-shared secrets; (2) Equal com-
putations on the two parties
Asymmetric-AKE Protocols Not requiring pre-shared secret (1) Requiring PKI; (2) Equal computations on
the two parties
Pairing-based ID-AKE Protocols Not requiring pre-shared secret or PKI (1) Involving time-consuming pairing opera-
tions; (2) Equal computations on the two parties
Pairing-free ID-AKE Protocols Not requiring pre-shared secret or PKI Equal computations on the two parties
(mBR) model [25] via Computational No Reveal-mBR (cNR-
mBR) game [27].
1) mBR Model: The mBR model is a well-defined model
for the security of AKE protocols. It models a protocol as
a pair P = (Π,G) where Π specifies behavior of honest
parties, and G generates key pairs. Let 1k be the security
parameter, i and j be the identities of sender and receiver
respectively, Kij be i’s key pair together with j’s public key,
tran be the transcript of the protocol run so far. The notation
Π(1k, i, j,Kij , tran) = (m, δ,K) denotes the execution of
the protocol, where m is the next message from i to j;
δ ∈ {Accept,Reject, ∗} is i’s current decision; and K is the
agreed session key.
2) cNR-mBR Game: The cNR-mBR game is a modular
approach to prove security of AKE protocols in mBR model.
The abilities and behaviors of an adversary E is specified as
follows:
• E has access to a collection of oracles Πsij which means
the sth protocol running between i and j.
• E is allowed to make a polynomial number of Send and
Corrupt queries to any oracle in any order.
• At the end of the game, E must choose an accepted and
fresh oracle Πsij
1; and to win the game, E must compute
the shared key.
AdvantageE(k) is defined as the probability that E outputs
a session key equals to the agreed session key of Πsij .
3) cNR-mBR-Secure: Based on the cNR-mBR game, the
protocol security in mBR model is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (cNR-mBR-Secure): A protocol Π is cNR-
mBR-secure if:
• In the presence of a benign adversary, two oracles running
the protocol both accept holding the same session ID and
session key which is distributed uniformly on {0, 1}k; and
• For any adversary E , AdvantageE(k) in the cNR-mBR
game is negligible.
4) Procedures of Proof: The security proof in mBR model
via cNR-mBR game is conducted as follows:
• First, transform the target protocol Π into a related
protocol Π′ which is identical to Π, except that the
session key produced by Π is the hashed output of the
session key produced by Π′.
• Second, prove the security of Π′ according to Definition
2.
1An oracle is unfresh if it is revealed, or it has a revealed partner, or if its
partner was corrupted. If an oracle is not unfresh, then the oracle is fresh.
• Finally, deduce the security of Π from the security of Π′
according to the following Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Let Π be an AKE protocol producing a hashed
session key (via hash function H); and suppose that Π has
strong partnering (Definition 3) and H is a random oracle.
If the cNR-mBR security of the related protocol Π′ is prob-
abilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the
computational problem of some relation f ; and the session
string decisional problem for Π is polynomial time reducible
to the decisional problem of f ; then the mBR security of Π
is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of
the Gap problem of f .
Definition 3 (Strong Partnering): A protocol has weak
partnering if there exists an adversary E to the protocol such
that AdvantageE(k) is non-negligible; and E can make any
two oracles accept holding the same session key when they
are not partners. A protocol has strong partnering if it does
not have weak partnering.
D. Casper/FDR
The proposed protocols are also formally verified using
Casper/FDR tool [28] which is a model checker for the pro-
cess algebra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [29].
Casper/FDR has been used to find previously unknown attacks
on some famous security protocols such as the Needham-
Schroeder public key protocol [30].
The Casper/FDR tool can verify secrecy and authenticity of
security protocols under various attack model; and the attack
model of our protocols is Dolev-Yao model [31].
Verifying protocols via Casper/FDR includes three proce-
dures. First, rewrite the protocol and use Casper standard input
script file to describe it. Second, compile the script file in
Casper and output the CSP code file. Finally, check the CSP
code via FDR.
IV. THE UNBALANCED AND PAIRING-FREE ID-AKA
PROTOCOLS
In this section we first present an overview for the proposed
ID-AKE protocols. Secondly, we present two unbalanced and
pairing-free ID-AKE protocols which unbalance the compu-
tational task of the protocol in [14]. Finally, we compare the
proposed protocols with existing protocols in related work.
A. Overview
1) Network Model: The ID-AKE protocol involves two
parties that are connected by wireless channels. We specify
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Fig. 1. Protocol I.
A as the initiating party, and B as the responding party. A
and B have different computational capabilities.
2) Threat Model: The wireless channels between A and B
are normal Dolev-Yao channels where the messages can be
overheard, deleted or modified by the attacker. Specifically,
the attackers have the following abilities.
• Basic ability. The attackers are able to observe, delete,
insert, delay or alter messages between A and B.
• Stronger ability 1. The attackers are able to obtain any
previous session keys.
• Stronger ability 2. The attackers are able to compromise
the long-term secret keys of A or B.
B. Protocol I
Protocol I reduces computational cost on the initiator A by
transferring one scalar multiplication from A to the responder
B. Therefore, it has better performance when the responder is
more powerful than the initiator. The protocol is presented as
follows. It is also illustrated in Figure 1.
1) Initialization :
• KGC Setup: Given a security parameter k, KGC
initializes system parameters params = {Fp, E,G,
P, Ppub, H1, H2} and the master-key x as follows.
– Fp, E and G are the same as we defined in Definition
1.
– P is a generator of G.
– x is a random value over Z∗p and Ppub = x× P .
– H1 and H2 are two cryptographic secure hash func-
tions. H1 maps an arbitrary string to Z∗p . H2 maps
an arbitrary string to {0, 1}k.
The system parameters are published to all the users and
the master-key is kept secretly by KGC.
• Key Extract: Given the identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, KGC
computes the corresponding ID-based private key as
follows.
– Generate a random value rID ∈ Z∗p and compute
RID = rID × P,
hID = H1(ID‖RID)
and
sID = rID + hIDx.
– Send (sID, RID) to the user through a secure out-
of-band channel.
• User Setup: Upon receiving (sID, RID), the user firstly
validates it through the following equation.
sID × P = RID +H1(ID‖RID)× Ppub.
If the equation holds, (sID, RID) are valid. Then the user
chooses a random value vID ∈ Z∗p and computes
VID = vID × P.
After the initialization, both A and B have the public
information params = {Fp, E,G, P, Ppub, H1, H2}. Be-
sides, A and B respectively hold (sA, RA, vA, VA) and
(sB , RB , vB , VB). The values of sA, sB , vA and vB should
be securely stored. Both A and B know the identity of each
other before the key agreement procedure.
2) Key Agreement:
• A firstly generates a random value a ∈ Z∗p and computes
uA = a+ vA. Then A sends the following message M1
to B.
A→ B : M1 = (RA, VA, uA).
• Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value
b ∈ Z∗p and computes uB = b+ vB and TB = uB × P .
Secondly, B computes the shared secrets as follows.
TA = uA × P
K1BA = sB×(TA−VA)+b×(RA+H1(A‖RA)×Ppub),
K2BA = b× (TA − VA).
Thirdly, B computes macB and sends M2 to A.
macB = HMAC(K
1
BA‖K2BA, RB‖VB‖TB‖TA)
where ‖ denotes the concatenation of bit strings.
B → A : M2 = (RB , VB , TB , TA,macB).
• Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared secrets
as follows.
K1AB = sA×(TB−VB)+a×(RB+H1(B‖RB)×Ppub),
K2AB = a× (TB − VB).
Secondly, A verifies macB as follows.
VER(K1AB‖K2AB , RB‖VB‖TB ,macB)
=
{
1, valid
0, invalid
Thirdly, if macB is valid, A computes macA and sends
M3 to B.
macA = HMAC(K
1
AB‖K2AB , RA‖VA‖uA)
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A→ B : M3 = macA
• Upon receiving M3, B verifies macA as follows.
VER(K1BA‖K2BA, RA‖VA‖uA,macA)
=
{
1, valid
0, invalid
K1AB = K
1
BA and K
2
AB = K
2
BA because:
K1AB = sA × (TB − VB) + a× (RB +H1(B‖RB)× Ppub)
= sA × (uB × P − VB) + asB × P
= sA × (b× P + vB × P − VB) + asB × P
= sAb× P + sBa× P
K1BA = sB × (TA − VA) + b× (RA +H1(A‖RA)× Ppub)
= sB × (uA × P − VA) + bsA × P
= sB × (a× P + vA × P − VA) + bsA × P
= sBa× P + sAb× P
= K1AB
K2AB = a× (TB − VB)
= a× (uB × P − VB)
= a× (b× P + vB × P − VB)
= ab× P
K2BA = b× (TA − VA)
= b× (uA × P − VA)
= b× (a× P + vA × P − VA)
= ba× P
= K2AB
3) Session Key Derivation: If macA and macB are valid,
A and B compute the session key as follows.
A computes
skAB = H2(A‖B‖TA‖TB‖K1AB‖K2AB).
B computes
skBA = H2(A‖B‖TA‖TB‖K1BA‖K2BA).
C. Protocol II
Protocol II reduces computational cost on B by transferring
one scalar multiplication from B to A. The protocol is pre-
sented as follows. Therefore, it has better performance when
the initiator is more powerful than the responder. The protocol
is presented as follows. It is also illustrated in Figure 2.
1) Initialization : The initialization procedure is exactly the
same with that in Section IV-B.
Fig. 2. Protocol II.
2) Key Agreement:
• A firstly generates a random value a ∈ Z∗p and computes
uA = a + vA and TA = uA × P . Then A sends the
following message M1 to B.
A→ B : M1 = (RA, VA, TA).
• Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value
b ∈ Z∗p and computes uB = b+ vB .
Secondly, B computes the shared secrets as follows.
K1BA = sB×(TA−VA)+b×(RA+H1(A‖RA)×Ppub),
K2BA = b× (TA − VA).
Thirdly, B computes macB and sends M2 to A.
macB = HMAC(K
1
BA‖K2BA, RB‖VB‖uB)
B → A : M2 = (RB , VB , uB ,macB).
• Upon receiving M2, A firstly computes the shared secrets
as follows.
TB = uB × P,
K1AB = SA×(TB−VB)+a×(RB+H1(B‖RB)×Ppub),
K2AB = a× (TB − VB).
Secondly, A verifies macB as follows.
VER(K1AB‖K2AB , RB‖VB‖uB ,macB)
=
{
1, valid
0, invalid
Thirdly, if macB is valid, A computes macA and sends
M3 to B.
macA = HMAC(K
1
AB‖K2AB , RA‖VA‖TA‖TB)
A→ B : M3 = (TB ,macA)
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• Upon receiving M3, B verifies macA as follows.
VER(K1BA‖K2BA, RA‖VA‖TA‖TB ,macA)
=
{
1, valid
0, invalid
3) Session Key Derivation: If macA and macB are valid,
A and B compute the session key as follows. A computes
skAB = H2(A‖B‖TA‖TB‖K1AB‖K2AB).
B computes
skBA = H2(A‖B‖TA‖TB‖K1BA‖K2BA).
D. Comparison with Existing Protocols
We compare the proposed protocols with existing protocols
in Table III and IV. Detailed analysis and evaluation will be
provided in the following three sections.
Table III compares the security of the proposed protocols
with typical ID-AKE protocols in related work. According to
the table, the proposed protocols have provable security in
mBR model; and their security have been formally verified by
the Casper/FDR tool. Therefore, in terms of security, they are
better than most of the other protocols compared in the table.
In Table IV, different types of AKE protocol are compared
in terms of functionality features. According to the table, the
proposed protocols do not rely on any pre-shared secret or
PKI, and have unbalanced cost on the parities. This makes
them have better performance in situations where the commu-
nicating parties have different computational capabilities.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security of Protocol I is studied through three methods.
We first prove the security of Protocol I under random oracle
model through mBR model. Secondly, we formally verify the
protocol using Casper/FDR. Finally, we analyze its resistance
to some attacks. Security of Protocol II is similar with that of
Protocol I; therefore, we do not provide detailed analysis in
this paper.
A. Security Proof
Security of Protocol I in mBR model is proved through the
following three procedures.
1) Transform Protocol I to I’: Protocol I’ is identical
to Protocol I except the session key derivation procedure.
Protocol I’ uses the string (A‖B‖TA‖TB‖K1AB‖K2AB) as the
session key.
2) Prove Security of Protocol I’: The cNR-mBR security
of Protocol I’ is proved as follows.
Theorem 2: Assume that H1 is a random oracle. Given the
security parameter k of Protocol I’, if there is an adversary E to
Protocol I’ can win the cNR-mBR game with non-negligible
probability σ in polynomial time τ , then the CDH problem
can be solved with non-negligible probability η 1n2pnsσ within
time τ where η is a constant.
Proof: Suppose A is an algorithm to solve the CDH
problem. A is given an instance (X,Y ) for some unknown
x,y ∈ [0, n − 1], and is asked to compute W such that
W = xyP . To do this, A simulates a challenger in a cNR-
mBR game with E . A stipulates the hash function H1 and
maintains an H1-list which is initialized empty. Let np denotes
the number of participants in the game, and ns denotes the
number of sessions each participant may be involved in. The
long-term key for the ith participant IDi is (si, Ri, vi, Vi)
and IDi is the corresponding public key. A randomly chooses
P0 ∈ G, sets P0 as Ppub, and generates IDi’s long-term key
as follows:
• First, A randomly chooses I from [1, np] and generates
the long-term key for IDI . In particular, A randomly
chooses hI , vI ∈ Z∗p and VI ∈ G, computes RI = Y −
hIP0, and sets (⊥, RI , vI , VI) as the long-term key.
• Second, A generates long-term key for IDi where i ∈
[1, np] and i 6= I . In particular, A randomly chooses
si, hi, vi ∈ Z∗p and Vi ∈ G, computes Ri = siP − hIP0,
and sets (si, Ri, vi, Vi) as the long-term key.
• Third, A passes Ri and IDi to E and adds {IDi, Ri, hi}
to the H1-list for i = 1, ..., np.
After generating the long-term keys, A randomly chooses
J ∈ [1, np] 6= I and v ∈ [1, ns], and starts E by answering
E’s queries as follows.
• H1(IDi, Ri): If {IDi, Ri, hi} is in the H1-list, A re-
sponses with hi; otherwise, A randomly chooses li ∈ Z∗p ,
responses with li, and adds {IDi, Ri, li} to the H1-list.
• Send(Isi,j ,M): If I
s
i,j 6= IvJ,j , A acts according to
the protocol specification; otherwise, A responds with
(IDj , Rj , X + Vj).
• Corrupt(i): If i = I , then A aborts; otherwise, A returns
si to E .
The probability that E chooses IvJ,j as the Test oracle and
that IDj = IDI is 1n2pns . In this case, E would not have
corrupted IDI ; therefore A would not have aborted. If E can
win in such a cNR − mBR game with probability σ, then
at the end of the game, E will output its guess of the session
key in the form ({0, 1}∗‖{0, 1}∗‖X + Vj‖Y ‖Z‖W ); and A
can output W as its solution to the CDH problem on input
(X,Y ) with non-negligible probability η 1n2pnsσ within time τ
where η is a constant.
3) Prove Security of Protocol I: We first prove that Protocol
I satisfies the property of strong partnering.
Theorem 3: Protocol I has strong partnering in the random
oracle model.
Proof: Denote the partner of user i by i′. Assume there
exists an adversary E who can make two oracles Isi,i′ and Itj,j′
accept holding the same session key when i′ 6= j and j′ 6=
i. If Isi,i′ is an initiator, to obtain the session key, it has to
make a query of the form {IDi, IDi′ , X, Y, Z,W} to the H2
random oracle. For Itj,j′ to have the same session key, it must
have made the H2 query of the form {IDj , IDj′ , X, Y, Z,W}
since IDj 6= IDi. Then it must have IDj′ = IDi and vice
versa. Thus Isi,i′ and I
t
j,j′ are partners, which contradicts the
assumption.
Thus it is impossible for E to obtain a qualified Itj,j′ when
Isi,i′ is an initiator. Similar we can prove this is impossible
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS WITH TYPICAL ID-AKE PROTOCOLS IN RELATED WORK.
AKE Protocol Category Provable Security Formal Verification
Protocol in [10] Pairing-based × ×
Protocol in [11] Pairing-based × ×
Protocol in [12] Pairing-based in BR model ×
Protocol in [13] Unbalanced pairing-based × ×
Protocol in [14] Pairing-free in mBR model ×
Protocol in [15] Pairing-free in eCK model ×
Protocol in [16] Pairing-free in eCK model ×
Protocol I Unbalanced and pairing-free in mBR model using Casper/FDR tool
Protocol II Unbalanced and pairing-free in mBR model using Casper/FDR tool
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF AKE PROTOCOLS.
Category of AKE Requiring Pre-shared Secret Requiring PKI Having Unbalanced Cost
Symmetric-AKE [17][18][19]
√ × ×
Asymmetric-AKE [20][21] × √ ×
Pairing-based ID-AKE [10][11][12] × × ×
Unbalanced and pairing-based ID-AKE [13] × × √
Pairing-free ID-AKE [14][15][16] × × ×
Unbalanced and pairing-free ID-AKE × × √
when Isi,i′ is a responder. Therefore, Protocol I has strong
partnering.
According to Theorem 1, 2 and 3, we have the following
conclusion: Protocol I is secure in the mBR model assuming
that H1 is a random oracle and the CDH and GDH problems
are difficult.
B. Formal Verification
We use the Casper/FDR tool to verify Protocol I, in par-
ticular, the authentication of exchange messages in Protocol
I.
Firstly, we rewrite Protocol I according to syntax of Casper
standard input script as follows:
• A→ B : ra, va, ua.
• B → A : rb, vb, tb, ta, hash(kab, rb, vb, tb, ta).
• A→ B : hash(kab, ra, va, ua)
In the above description, ra, va, ua, rb, vb, tb, ta and hash
correspond to RA, VA, uA, RB , VB , TB , TA and HMAC,
and kab corresponds to K1AB‖K2AB in Protocol I.
Secondly, we use Casper to compile the script into CSP
code. The CSP code which can be run directly in FDR is
uploaded to GitHub2. Finally, we verify the CSP code via
FDR. The result is shown in Figure 3. According to the figure,
no attack is found. Therefore, the authentication of RA, VA,
uA, RB , VB and TB are guaranteed in Protocol I. This means
attackers are unable to launch the man-in-the-middle attack to
the protocol.
2https://github.com/cuttercn/upfidakeProtocol
Fig. 3. FDR checking result of Protocol I.
C. Resistance to Attacks
We analyze how Protocol I is resistant to some commonly
encountered attacks as follows.
1) Resistance to Impersonation Attacks: Assume E is an
impersonation attacker to Protocol I. The long-term key of E
is (sE , RE , vE , VE). To launch the attack, E impersonates A
and interacts with B as follows.
• E firstly generates a random value e ∈ Zp∗ and computes
uE = e + vE . Then E sends the following message M1
to B.
E → B : M1 = (RE , VE , uE).
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• Upon receiving M1, B firstly generates a random value
b ∈ Z∗p and computes uB = b+ vB and TB = uB × P .
Secondly, B computes the shared secrets as follows.
TE = uE × P
K1BE = sB× (TE −VE)+ b× (RE +H1(A‖RE)×Ppub),
K2BE = b× (TE − VE).
Thirdly, B computes macB and sends M2 to E .
macB = HMAC(K
1
BE‖K2BE , RB‖VB‖TB‖TE)
B → A : M2 = (RB , VB , TB , TE ,macB).
• Upon receiving M2, E firstly computes the shared secrets
as follows.
K1EB = sE×(TB−VB)+e×(RB+H1(B‖RB)×Ppub),
K2EB = e× (TB − VB).
Secondly, E needs to compute a macE which can pass
the verification of B in the following step. E is unable to
compute such a macE from K1EB and K
2
EB since K
1
EB 6=
K1BE .
• In this step, the verification of macE fails; and B termi-
nates the protocol. The attack fails.
Similarly, if E impersonates B, the attack will fail.
2) Forward Secrecy under Stolen Device Attacks: Forward
secrecy guarantees that the attacker who corrupts the long-term
keys of the participants cannot reveal session keys in previous
sessions. It is a significant security feature, in particular, when
the device is stolen by the attacker. In this case, the participants
can reset the long-term keys; and previous communicating
messages will be secure if forward secrecy is provided. Bellow
we will analyze how Protocol I provide forwards secrecy under
the stolen device attack.
In Protocol I, the session key skAB of a previous session is
derived from K1AB and K
2
AB ; and the computation of K
1
AB
and K2AB involve two random values a and b. The random
values are generated in every session of the protocol, and are
disposed after the session. As a result, E is unable to acquire
a and b of a pervious session. Therefore, E cannot reveal
previous session keys.
VI. PERFORMANCE
In order to study the performance of the proposed protocols,
we first evaluate their computational costs and compare with
existing pairing-free ID-AKE protocols. Then, two sets of
experiments are carried out. Experiment I is used to study
the computational cost. It verifies whether Protocol I and II
have unbalanced computational requirements and are more
friendly to limited devices than existing pairing-free ID-AKE
protocols. Experiment II is used to study the availability of the
protocols in disaster scenarios. It verifies whether Protocol I
and II are more convenient and suitable for disaster scenarios
than symmetric and traditional asymmetric cryptography based
AKE protocols.
TABLE V
COST EVALUATION.
Protocol Scalar multiplication
on A
Scalar multiplication
on B
[14] 5 5
[15] 6 6
[16] 6 6
Protocol I 4 6
Protocol II 6 4
TABLE VI
EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT OF EXPERIMENT I-1.
Party Operating System Base Memory Storage
A Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
B Ubuntu 16.04.3 (32-bit) 1024 MB 10 GB
A. Evaluation
The computational cost is evaluated by the number of scalar
multiplication on each party (Table V).
According to Table V, Protocol I has the lowest computa-
tional cost on A; and Protocol II has the lowest computational
cost on B. Therefore, when A is a limited device, Protocol
I is the most suitable ID-AKE protocol; when B is a limited
device, Protocol II is the most suitable ID-AKE protocol.
B. Experiment I: Computational Cost
We realize prototypes of Protocol I, II and typical pairing-
free ID-AKE protocols in [14] and [15] using Python pro-
gramming language. Two experiments are carried out; and
computational time is tested to observe the computational cost.
The experiments are introduced as follows.
1) Experiment I-1: Experiment I-1 is used to verify whether
Protocol I and II have unbalance computational requirements.
In the experiment, we deploy the initiator A and the responder
B on two virtual machines with the same configuration (Table
VI). We have run the prototype of each protocol for ten
times on three of recommended elliptic curves in Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS), i.e., P-192, P-256
and P-384. The average computational time is illustrated in
Figure 4.
According to Figure 4, for all of the three curves, Protocol
I has the lowest computational time on A. Protocol II has
the lowest computational time on B. We have the following
conclusions:
• Protocol I has lower computational requirement on A than
on B.
• Protocol II has lower computational requirement on B
than on A.
2) Experiment I-2: Experiment I-2 is used to verify whether
Protocol I and II are more friendly to limited devices than
the protocols in [14] and [15]. In this experiment, we use
a Raspberry Pi to simulate the limited device and a laptop
to simulate the powerful one. For Protocol I, the initiator
A is deployed on the Raspberry Pi. For Protocol II, the
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Fig. 4. Average computational time in Experiment I-1.
Fig. 5. Hardware platform of Experiment I-2.
responder B is deployed on the Raspberry Pi. The details
of the experimental environment are listed in Table VII. The
hardware platform is illustrated in Figure 5. We have run the
prototypes for ten times on P-256. The average runtime is
illustrated in Figure 6.
According to Figure 6, the computational time on the
Raspberry Pi of Protocol I and II are much less than that of the
protocols in [14] and [15]; the overall computational time of
Protocol I and II are also much less than that of the protocols
in [14] and [15]. We have the following two conclusions:
• Protocol I and II are more friendly to limited devices than
the protocols in [14] and [15].
• In terms of computational time, the overall performance
of Protocol I and II are better than that of the protocols
in [14] and [15]
C. Experiment II: Availability
We evaluate the availability of Protocol I (or II), a sym-
metric cryptography-based AKE protocol in [17] (denoted
Fig. 6. Average computational time in Experiment I-2.
as symmetric-AKE) and an asymmetric cryptography based
AKE protocol in Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard
[20] (denoted as TLS-AKE). The experiment is described as
follows.
1) Assumption: Let N denote the set of devices (carried by
|N |, i.e. the length of set the N , rescue officers) entering into
a disaster area where the network infrastructures are destroyed;
N1 denote the subset of N that devices have shared master
keys with each other; N2 denote the subset of N that devices
have public keys of each other; and N3 denote the subset of N
that devices neither have shared master keys nor have public
keys of each other. When a device A ∈ N1 (or A ∈ N2)
needs to establish a secure link with a device B, it at first
tries the symmetric-AKE protocol (or TLS-AKE protocol).
If B /∈ N1 (or B /∈ N2), they will then use Protocol I or
II. The availability of symmetric-AKE protocol in [17], TLS-
AKE protocol in [20] and the proposed Protocol I or II are
evaluated by P1, P2 and P3 as follows:
• P1 = Pr(A ∈ N1 ∩ B ∈ N1) = ( |N1||N | )2: the probability
that two arbitrary devices A and B successfully execute
the symmetric-AKE protocol.
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TABLE VII
EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT OF EXPERIMENT I-2.
Experimental Device CPU Base Memory Hard Disk
Raspberry Pi 1.2 GMHz ARM 1 GB 32 GB
laptop 2.40 GHz i5-6200U 4 GB 120 GB
• P2 = Pr(A ∈ N2 ∩ B ∈ N2) = ( |N2||N | )2: the probability
that two arbitrary devices A and B successfully execute
the TLS-AKE protocol.
• P3 = 1−P1−P2 = 1−( |N1||N | )2−( |N1||N | )2: the probability
that two arbitrary devices A and B successfully execute
Protocol I or II.
2) Experiment: In the experiment, we generate 1000 groups
of random value for (|N1|, |N2|, |N3|). The results of P1, P2
and P3 are compared in Figure 7. According to Figure 7,
for two arbitrary devices in the disaster area, in most cases,
the success probability of Protocol I or II (P3) is larger than
that of symmetric-AKE protocol [17] and TLS-AKE protocol
[20] (P1 and P2). Besides, when the proportion of N3 in N
increases, P3 increases while P1 and P2 decrease.
Therefore, we have two conclusions as follows:
• Protocol I (or II) has a higher availability than symmetric-
AKE protocol [17] and TLS-AKE protocol [20] in a
disaster scenario.
• As the number of unacquainted devices (devices do
not have shared master key or exchanged public key)
increases, the availability of Protocol I (or II) grows
while that of symmetric-AKE protocol [17] and TLS-
AKE protocol [20] decrease.
It is inconvenient for devices (or rescuer officers) from
different organizations to share master keys or have public
keys with each other; and rescue officers for mass casualty
disasters often come from various organizations (even differ-
ent countries). Therefore, Protocol I and II show significant
advantage in terms of availability in rescues for mass casualty
disasters such as earthquake, typhoon and war.
VII. USE CASE
This section illustrates the application of Protocol I and II
via a use case of rescuing in an affected area after a terrorist
attack.
A. Scenario Description
We use a wasteland in the suburb to simulate the affected
area after a terrorist attack. The power and network infrastruc-
tures are destroyed by the attack. A group of “rescuers” acted
by our volunteers will enter the “affected area” (Figure 8 ).
At first, a police named Bob with his smart phone enters
the “affected area”. After ten minutes, an emergency medical
technician named Alice with her laptop arrives at the “affected
area”. (In a real affected area, there will be mobile tents or
ambulances for the emergency medical technician to place the
laptop.) Meanwhile, a criminal named Malice with his tablet
sneaks into the “affected area”. This is quite possible in a real
affected area since there can be several entrances to the area.
Now, all of Bob, Alice and Malice are in the “affected area”.
Protocol I and II will be used as the foundation to protect the
communication between Alice’s laptop and Bob’s smart phone
from being attacked by Malice’s tablet.
B. Application of Protocol I and II
The following procedures illustrate how to apply Protocol I
and II in protecting communications in the above scenario.
1) Setup: Both Alice’s laptop and Bob’s smart phone
should be configured to support Protocol I and II. In particular,
Alice’s laptop is regarded as a powerful device; therefore, we
configure it with the code of responder of Protocol I and that
of initiator of Protocol II. Bob’s smart phone is regarded as
a limited device; therefore, we configure it with the code of
initiator of Protocol I and that of responder of Protocol II.
In addition, Both Alice’s laptop and Bob’s smart phone also
should be configured with encryption/decrytion schemes such
as AES and message authentication code schemes such as
HMAC.
2) Secure Handshake: Alice’s laptop and Bob’s smart
phone collaboratively run Protocol I or II to establish a shared
key. There are two cases:
• If Bob’s smart phone initiates the communication with
Alice’s laptop, Bob’s smart phone will run the code of
initiator of Protocol I; and Alice’s laptop will run the
code of responder of Protocol I.
• If Alice’s laptop initiates the communication with Bob’s
smart phone, Alice’s laptop will run the code of initiator
of Protocol II; and Bob’s smart phone will run the code
of responder of Protocol II.
At the end of secure handshake, a session key sk is established
for Alice’s laptop and Bob’s smart phone.
3) Secure Messaging: When Alice’s laptop intends to send
a message MAB to Bob’s smart phone, her laptop first encrypts
MAB into {MAB}skAB and computes a message authenti-
cation code macAB for {MAB}skAB . Then {MAB}skAB is
sent along with macAB . After receiving the message, Bob’s
smart phone first verifies macAB . If the verification succeeds,
his smart phone decrypts {MAB}skAB and acquires {MAB}.
When Bob’s smart phone intends to send a message MAB to
Alice’s laptop, the process is similar as above.
Without the session key skAB , Malice’s tablet is unable to
reveal, tamper or fake the message.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated suitable ID-AKE protocols
in disaster scenarios. We proposed the idea to unbalance the
computing tasks of existing pairing-free ID-AKE protocols.
Based on the idea, we designed two unbalanced and pairing-
free ID-AKE protocols that transfer one scalar multiplication
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Fig. 7. Probabilities of success in terms of symmetric-AKE protocol [17], TLS-AKE protocol [20] and Protocol I or II in a disaster scenario.
from one side to another. Prototypes of the protocols were
realized to study the performance. We also illustrated how to
apply the proposed protocols via a use case.
The proposed idea can be used to unbalance the computa-
tional costs of other existing pairing-free ID-AKE protocols.
In the future, we plan to modify some of existing pairing-free
ID-AKE protocols into unbalanced ones. In addition, we are
going to transfer more scalar multiplications from one side to
another in pairing-free ID-AKE protocols.
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